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STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E O F U T A H , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
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B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T 
S T A T E M E N T O F 
T H E N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
The appellant, Charles Albert Winning, appeals 
from the sentence imposed by the Third District Court 
following his entry of a guilty plea to a Class A Mis-
demeanor of theft. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The appellant plead guilty to a Class A Misde-
meanor of theft before the Honorable Jay Banks, in 
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the Third District Court, on August 30, 1974. The 
Appellant then waived his time for sentencing and re-
quested that sentence be imposed immediately. The 
court sentenced the appellant to one year in the Salt 
Lake County Jail, denying his credit for presentence 
confinement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent respectfully submits that the sen-
tence imposed by the Court below should be affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
On June 11, 1974, the appellant was booked into 
Salt Lake County Jail on a charge of felony auto theft. 
The appellant was arraigned in city court on June 17, 
1974, and his preliminary hearing was set for July 19, 
1974 (T.2). On June 17, 1974, the Salt Lake City 
Court found the appellant indigent and appointed the 
Legal Defenders to represent him (T.2). After one 
continuance requested by the state (T.2), the appellant's 
preliminary hearing was held on July 29, 1974, and he 
was bound over (T.2). The appellant was arraigned in 
Third District Court on August 2, 1974, and entered 
his plea of not guilty (T.14). Trial was set for August 
30, 1974 (T.14). On August 30, 1974, the date set for 
appellant's trial, he pled guilty to a lesser included 
Class A Misdemeanor (T. 15,29). The appellant ac-
knowledged that he was waiving his right of trial (T.27). 
The Court found that the appellant made his guilty plea 
knowingly and voluntarily and that it was part of a 
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plea bargain to avoid a possible conviction of a greater 
crime which carried a greater penalty (T.29). The 
appellant waived time for sentencing and asked that 
sentence be imposed immediately (T.15,29). The appel-
lant represented to the court that he had a long criminal 
record (T.18). The court sentenced the defendant to 
one year in the Salt Lake County Jail (T.29). The 
appellant requested the court to give him credit for ap-
proximately ten weeks he had spent in the Salt Lake 
County Jail prior to his sentencing (T.30). The court 
refused (T.30). The appellant, by and through his at-
torney, objected on the record to the court's refusal to 
give credit for the time served, stating that such refusal 
was in violation of equal protection guarantees (T.30). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
F A I L U R E TO G I V E T H E A P P E L -
L A N T C R E D I T FOR P R E T R I A L 
C O N F I N E M E N T I N T H E SALT 
L A K E COUNTY J A I L IS NOT IL-
L E G A L U N D E R T H E E Q U A L PRO-
T E C T I O N C L A U S E OF T H E FOUR-
T E E N T H A M E N D M E N T . 
I t has become an established principle of law that 
credit for pretrial confinement is a matter of state law 
and no federal question is involved. Burns v. Crouse, 
339 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Hundley v. Page, 398 
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F.2d 351 (10th Cir 1968) ; Johnson v. Beto, 383 F.2d 
197 (5th Cir. 1967). 
There is no Utah statute nor rule that requires a 
trial judge to grant a defendant credit for time which 
he has served in jail before there is an ascertainment 
of guilt and the imposition of sentence. Without any 
legislation, credit for pretrial confinement is not a mat-
ter of right, since there is no constitutional right to 
credit. People v. Jones, 176 Colo. 61, 489 P.2d 596 
(1971); Williams v. State, 2 Md.App. 170, 234 A.2d 
260 (1967); Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293 
(5th Cir. 1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. JaranvUlo, 
25 Utah 2d 328, 481 P.2d 394 (1971), stated that it 
was the duty of prison authorities and the Board of 
Pardons to take into consideration time previously ser-
ved in determining when a prisoner should be released. 
There is no constitutional mandate from the United 
States Supreme Court requiring that the courts grant 
the credit demanded by the appellant. North Carolina 
V. Pierce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d. 
388 (1968), requires "that punishment already exacted 
must be fully 'credited' in imposing sentence upon a 
new conviction for the same offense." The appellant 
does not fall within this ruling since he was in pretrial 
confinement and not serving time for a conviction. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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P O I N T I I 
A P P E L L A N T ' S C O N S T I T U T I O N A L 
R I G H T TO A J U R Y T R I A L W A S NOT 
C H I L L E D BY T H E COURT'S D E C I -
SION NOT TO G I V E A P P E L L A N T 
C R E D I T F O R T I M E S E R V E D P R I O R 
TO S E N T E N C I N G . 
When there has been a claim that a defendant's 
right to a jury trial has been chilled by state action, 
the court should review the record for evidence of this 
claim, and disallow it if no evidence is found. White v. 
GilUgan, 351 F.Supp. 1012 (USDC, S.D. Ohio, E.D. 
1972). 
The record is void of any claim or inference by the 
defendant that his guilty plea was forced by a chilling 
effect that his pretrial confinement would not be credit-
ed against his sentence. The appellant acknowledged 
that he was waiving his right to a trial (T.27), and 
that no promises, threats, or coercion had been used 
against him (T.28). The court found that the appellant 
had entered the guilty plea as part of a plea bargain in 
order to avoid a possible conviction of a greater crime 
which carried a greater penalty and that the plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily entered (T.29). 
I t would also be difficult for the appellant to claim 
that the failure to credit chilled his right to a trial, since 
he waived the trial and plead guilty before the court 
announced that it would not credit the pretrial confine-
ment (T.30). 
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P O I N T I I I 
F A I L U R E TO G I V E A P P E L L A N T 
C R E D I T F O R P R E T R I A L C O N F I N E -
M E N T D O E S NOT V I O L A T E T H E 
F I F T H A M E N D M E N T G U A R A N T E E 
A G A I N S T D O U B L E J E O P A R D Y . 
The appellant is not entitled to credit for the time 
served in the County Jail before he plead guilty and it 
does not constitute double punishment where the plea 
entered was a result of a plea bargain and the charge 
which was subject of the plea bargain was not the basis 
of the appellant's presentence confinement if the sen-
tence imposed was within the statutory limits and did 
not infringe upon appellant's constitutional rights. 
People v. Mieyr, 176 Colo. 90, 489 P.2d 327 (1971). 
The appellant's pretrial confinement in the Salt 
Lake County Jail was based on a complaint issued by 
the Salt Lake City Court charging the appellant with 
theft, a felony of the second degree, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953) (T.3). Due to the plea 
bargaining with the county attorney, the appellant 
eventually plead guilty to theft of a value more than 
$100.00 and less than $250.00, a Class A Misdemeanor 
(T.27). Therefore, the p resentencing confinement was 
on a different charge than the one to which appellant 
plead guilty and was sentenced by the court. 
The appellant was sentenced to one year in the 
county jail, which is the maximum authorized by Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (Supp. 1973). No promises were 
made at the time the plea agreement was entered into 
or when sentence was imposed. The court was well 
aware of the time that had been served before sentence 
was imposed (T.30), but it appears that the court had 
no intention of allowing the appellant to benefit beyond 
his plea bargain. 
In a similar appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court 
in People v. Nelson, 510 P.2d 441 (1973), stated: 
"Where, however, the sentencing judge 
states only that he is taking time spent into 
consideration and therefore gives the maxi-
mum, it must be presumed that he acted 
properly; that is, that he took the time spent 
into consideration and determined, as he had 
the right to do, not to grant the credit." 510 
P.2d at 442. 
Since Utah has no statute requiring judges to give 
credit, and since the sentence was within the statutory 
limits there was no infringement upon the appellant's 
constitutiional rights. 
P O I N T IV 
F A I L U R E TO G I V E T H E I N D I G E N T 
A P P E L L A N T C R E D I T FOR P R E -
S E N T E N C I N G C O N F I N E M E N T I S 
NOT A V I O L A T I O N O F T H E E Q U A L 
P R O T E C T I O N CLAUSE O F T H E 
U N I T E D S T A T E S CONSTITUTION. 
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In Sobell v. Attorney General of the U.S., 400 
F.2d 986 (3d Cir.), cert. den. 393 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 
302, 21 L.Ed.2d 277 (1968), the defendant was finan-
cially unable to make bail, and the court refused to 
credit him for his presentence confinement. In rebutting 
the defendant's contention that because of his indigency 
the government had violated his equal protection rights, 
the court stated: 
" I t is true that, as between one who 
could afford bail and one who could not, it 
worked a hardship on the latter . . . But this 
consequence flowed from what we must assume 
was a proper imprisonment. While the result 
may be unfair it is not sufficiently invidious 
to reach constitutional proportions." 400 F.2d 
at 900. See Valcarcel v. United States, 409 
F.2d211 (2d Cir. 1969). 
In Sullivan v. Cupp, 1 Or.App. 388, 462 P.2d 455 
(1970), an indigent defendant was denied credit for his 
confinement awaiting disposition of his appeal. In dis-
posing of an equal protection argument the court stated: 
"He claims that since the only reason he 
had to remain in jail during the pendency of 
his appeal was because he could not make bail, 
he has been denied the equal protection of the 
law as guaranteed by the U.S. Const. Amend, 
XIV, 1. The basis of his contention is that he 
is discriminated against because a rich man 
could have posted bail, whereas an indigent 
which he claims he then was, could not . . . 
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We find no merit in this contention." 462 
P.2d at 456. 
An identical argument has been made concerning 
the posting of bail before trial, and has been held in-
valid. Bigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 
1965), cert. den. 384 U.S. 975, 86 S.Ct. 1868, 16 L.Ed. 
2d 685 (1966). There the court said: 
"(A)dmittedly, there is a classification 
between those who can and those who cannot 
make bail. The Constitution, however, permits 
such a classification." 355 F.2d at 715. 
The State, through its appropriate agents, the 
police and the prosecutor, is entitled to a reasonable 
amount of time to accomplish its constitutional processes 
of bringing to justice persons who are accused of violat-
ing the law. Pretrial detention in lieu of bail is in no 
way punitive, but is designed solely to assure the appear-
ance at trial of a defendant who cannot make bail. 
United States v. Erwing, 268 F.Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 
1967). 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the 
generally accepted practice in both state and federal 
courts of confining before trial those indigents who can-
not make bail but releasing more affluent defendants 
who can. The respondent submits that the same con-
clusion should be reached concerning the crediting of 
time spent in jail against sentences of indigent persons 
who cannot make bail. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, respondent submits 
that the appellant was not denied aqual protection of 
the law nor did he suffer double jeopardy or any chilling 
effect of his right to trial as alleged. Therefore, respon-
dent respectfully submits that the sentence of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
E A R L F . D O R I U S 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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